Previous research has shown that linking approach or avoidance actions to novel stimuli through mere instructions causes changes in the implicit evaluation of these stimuli even when the actions are never performed. In two high-powered experiments (total N = 1147), we examined whether effects of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit evaluations are mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. Participants first received information about the evaluative properties of two fictitious social groups (e.g., Niffites are good; Luupites are bad) and then received instructions to approach one group and avoid the other group. We observed an effect of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit but not explicit evaluations of the groups, even when these instructions were incompatible with the previously obtained evaluative information. These results indicate that approach-avoidance instructions allow for unintentional changes in implicit evaluations. We discuss implications for current theories of implicit evaluation.
Instructing Implicit Processes: When Instructions to Approach or Avoid Influence Implicit but not Explicit Evaluation
The way in which humans evaluate stimuli as good or bad has long been a central research topic in various sub-disciplines of psychology (Allport, 1935) . In contemporary research on evaluations, researchers often contrast deliberate, explicit evaluations and spontaneous, implicit evaluations (see De Houwer, 2009a; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) . Typically, theorists have postulated distinct underlying processes, with explicit evaluations resulting from belief-based processes that involve the validation of propositional information, and implicit evaluations being the product of processes involving the automatic activation of associations in memory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) .
Given the unique relation between implicit evaluations and behavior (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009) , it is vital to understand how implicit stimulus evaluations are acquired and can be changed. Because implicit evaluation is traditionally attributed to the activation of associations between representations in memory and because associations are typically thought to develop gradually over many experiences, it is sometimes assumed that implicit evaluations of stimuli arise exclusively as the result of repeated experiences, such as recurrent pairings of physical stimuli (Rydell & McConnell, 2006) . Evaluative conditioning (EC) research provides ample evidence that changes in the implicit evaluation of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS) occur when it is paired with a valenced stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US; for a review see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) . Moreover, research on approach and avoidance (AA) training has suggested that changes in implicit evaluations can be obtained by pairing a stimulus with a valenced action (i.e., approach or avoidance). Typically, the repeated approaching of one stimulus and avoiding of another stimulus leads to more positive implicit evaluations for the former stimuli (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013 ; but see Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011) .
Recent research has, however, shown that implicit evaluations change even when pairings are not experienced directly, but are implied by the verbal presentation of relational information via instructions. For instance, studies on instructed EC have shown that changes in the implicit evaluation of a CS occur when verbal instructions link a CS with a valenced US even when the CS-US pairings are not experienced directly (De Houwer, 2006; Gast & De Houwer, 2012) .
Similarly, in a recent study we observed typical AA training effects when participants did not actually perform AA actions, but were merely instructed that they would later have to perform these actions (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015) . That is, participants who received instructions to approach one fictitious social group (e.g., Niffites) and avoid another fictitious social group (e.g., Luupites) showed a preference for the former group both on implicit measures (i.e., the Implicit Association Test, IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998 ; and the evaluative priming task, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986 ) and explicit measures of evaluation.
These findings pose a challenge to associative and dual-process models of evaluation which assume that implicit evaluations result from the gradual formation of associations in memory as the result of actual pairings (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Rydell & McConnell, 2006) .
In contrast, contemporary dual-process models in which association formation processes can interact with propositional learning processes allow one to explain effects of instructions on implicit evaluations. For instance, the Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 2014) postulates that associations may sometimes arise as the result of the generation and validation of propositions. More specifically, when people determine in a propositional manner that a stimulus is either positive or negative this may instigate the proactive construction of new associations between representations of the stimulus and representations of positivity or negativity. As a result, any information that allows participants to consciously entertain the proposition that a stimulus is positive or negative may influence implicit evaluations. In line with this idea, changes in implicit evaluations have been observed when participants are provided with information about the valenced properties of a stimulus (Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith & Arcuri, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009; .
Importantly, these models predict a specific pattern of mediation such that instruction effects on explicit evaluation should mediate effects on implicit evaluation (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Case 4) . That is, instructions should first influence whether participants consider a stimulus positive or negative (which is reflected in explicit evaluations) before this may lead to the formation of novel associations (which is reflected in implicit evaluations).
Support for this idea was found by Whitfield and Jordan (2009) , who observed that receiving information about the behavior of unknown individuals caused changes in implicit evaluations of these individuals that were fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations.
Contrasting this result, our previous study on AA instruction effects provided evidence that changes in explicit evaluations do not fully mediate effects of AA instructions on implicit evaluations. Statistical mediation analyses indicated that the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluations was partly mediated by changes in explicit evaluations, but an effect remained after controlling for changes in explicit evaluation (Van Dessel et al., 2015) . This is an intriguing finding because it suggests that mere (AA) instructions may sometimes cause unintentional changes in (implicit) stimulus evaluations. Instructions may have a direct effect on
implicit evaluation (i.e., unmediated by changes in explicit evaluation) and may therefore cause changes in implicit evaluations even when participants do not consider the instructions as a valid basis for their (explicit) evaluation.
However, on the basis of the available evidence it is premature to conclude that AA instructions can influence implicit evaluation without any mediation by changes in explicit evaluation. Most importantly, our earlier AA instruction study (Van Dessel et al., 2015) included only statistical analyses of mediation. This measurement-of-mediation approach, however, is ultimately correlational in nature, and is thus problematic for establishing a causal chain (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) . This is especially the case when examining patterns of mediation between implicit and explicit evaluations. When a manipulation affects both implicit and explicit measures of evaluation, the particular direction of the obtained mediation pattern is strongly influenced by the internal consistency of the employed measure (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) . Moreover, when implicit and explicit evaluations are strongly correlated (as was the case in our previous study), this creates multicollinearity which inflates the standard error of all variables in the mediation model and compromises the estimation of the indirect effect (Alin, 2010) . Hence, when examining mediation of implicit and explicit evaluations, it is strongly recommended to supplement statistical mediation analyses with experimental manipulations (De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013) . This is particularly true if, as in our case, a theoretical debate requires the precise understanding of the causal relation.
In the current studies, we used both a statistical and an experimental approach to test the extent to which the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluation is mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. We manipulated the proposed mediating variable (i.e., changes in explicit evaluation) by providing participants with 'trait instructions' that should prevent an impact of AA instructions on explicit evaluation. In line with Gregg et al. (2006) , we asked participants to imagine that the members of one fictitious social group had very positive traits and the members of another fictitious social group had very negative traits (e.g., Niffites are peaceful, civilized, benevolent, and law-abiding; Luupites are violent, savage, malicious, and lawless). Subsequently, participants received instructions to approach or avoid these social groups. Whereas trait instructions directly specify the evaluative properties of the social group, AA instructions only provide evaluative information if participants infer that the task to approach or avoid members of a group tells something about the evaluative properties of that group. Participants might rely on this inference when they have no other information about the evaluative properties of the group, but even then they will probably be aware that this inference rests on shaky grounds. Prior research indeed suggests that participants are likely to refrain from using information that has a low diagnostic validity (such as AA instructions) when more valid information (such as instructions about evaluative traits) is available (Lynch, 2005; . For these reasons, we expected that participants who received trait instructions would not take the AA instructions into account when explicitly evaluating the stimuli. We examined whether, under these circumstances, AA instructions would still cause changes in implicit evaluation. That is, we examined whether an AA instruction effect on implicit evaluation would be observed not only in the absence of mediation by changes in explicit evaluation, but even when there is no impact on explicit evaluation. The latter result would not only confirm that AA instructions can have a direct effect on implicit evaluation (because mediation via changes in explicit evaluation can occur only if there are changes in explicit evaluation) but would also support the novel conclusion that this direct effect can arise even when participants do not have the intention to use the AA instructions for evaluating the stimuli.
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If we would find that AA instructions influence implicit evaluation in the absence of (mediation by) changes in explicit evaluation, this is bound to have important theoretical implications. First, it would strongly constrain current and future models of (implicit) evaluation.
For instance, it would contradict dual-process models that assume that (1) only directly experienced repeated pairings can influence implicit evaluations (Smith & DeCoster, 2000) , and it would contradict dual-process models that assume that (2) instructions can only influence implicit evaluation via the mediation of explicit evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) .
To accommodate these findings, dual-process accounts would need to make additional assumptions (e.g., that strong associations can form as the result of a single pairing of a valenced word and a stimulus even in the absence of changes in explicit evaluation).
Finding an impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluation but not on explicit evaluation would also constrain single-process propositional models of evaluation (De Houwer, 2009b; 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009 ). These models postulate that both implicit and explicit evaluations arise exclusively as the result of propositional processes. Prima facie, these models seem less equipped to explain dissociations between implicit and explicit evaluations (e.g., a change in implicit evaluation in the absence of a similar change in explicit evaluation).
However, dissociations do not necessarily mean that different processes underlie these different types of evaluation. Rather, dissociations may arise because implicit and explicit measures of evaluation are differentially sensitive to the truth evaluation of propositional information. For example, when participants are told that a specific stimulus has to be approached, they might consider the possibility that this stimulus is good because it has to be approached. If this newly formed proposition can be activated automatically (e.g., in the sense of unintentional) then it may influence implicit evaluation even when the proposition is not considered valid (De Houwer, 2014). In contrast, explicit evaluation may be more contingent on the outcome of truth validation processes.
Second, finding an AA instruction effect on implicit but not explicit evaluation would provide valuable information about the mechanisms that specifically underlie the acquisition of evaluations by means of AA training, that is, by means of the repeated actual performance of approach and avoidance responses. Currently, there is ample evidence that training-based effects involve changes in implicit evaluation that are not mediated by changes in explicit evaluations (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009 ). These findings have typically been interpreted as evidence that training directly influences processes of association-formation.
However, these effects might also reflect the acquisition of propositional information that specifically influences implicit evaluation (e.g., because it allows for the automatic activation of propositions) but not explicit evaluation (e.g., because the information is not considered a valid basis for evaluation). If we observe an impact of AA instructions on implicit but not explicit evaluations, this would support the idea that propositional information can indeed influence implicit evaluations independently of changes in explicit evaluation.
We conducted two experiments to investigate whether the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluations is mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. In Experiment 1, half of the participants first received instructions that specified the traits of the fictitious social groups.
Subsequently, participants received instructions to approach the names of members of one of the social groups and avoid the names of members of the second social group. For half of the participants, these AA instructions were supplemented with actual AA training. We then assessed implicit and explicit evaluations of the social groups. With this design, two tests are possible of the hypothesis that AA instructions allow for a direct influence on implicit evaluation. First, it can be tested whether AA instructions influence implicit evaluations even after statistically controlling for changes in explicit evaluations. Second, it can be tested if AA instructions influence implicit evaluations even if trait instructions prevent the effects of AA instructions on explicit evaluations. To investigate this issue, we supplemented standard significance tests with Bayesian analyses. Bayesian analyses were performed according to the procedures outlined by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009) . These procedures provide a Bayes Factor (BF) that gives an indication of how strongly the data support either the null hypothesis (BF 0 ; reflecting the absence of a significant effect) or the alternative hypothesis (BF 1 ; reflecting the presence of a significant effect). BFs smaller than 1, between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, respectively designate 'no evidence', 'anecdotal evidence', and 'substantial evidence', for either the null or the alternative hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961) . We examined whether, in the presence of trait instructions, AA instructions do not cause changes in explicit evaluation (i.e., analyses provide substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, BF 0 > 3) yet still cause changes in implicit evaluation (i.e., analyses provide substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis, BF 1 > 3).
In Experiment 2, all participants received trait instructions and subsequently received either AA instructions that were compatible with these instructions (e.g., instructions to approach Niffites when participants had been asked to imagine that Niffites have positive traits), AA instructions that were incompatible with these instructions (e.g., instructions to avoid Niffites when participants had been asked to imagine that Niffites have positive traits), or no AA instructions. We examined whether changes in implicit evaluations arise in the absence of changes in explicit evaluations when AA instructions are compatible with the trait instructions (and thus strengthen the previously acquired evaluations) or when they are incompatible with the trait instructions (and thus revise the previously acquired evaluations).
Experiment 1 Method
Participants and Design. In Experiment 1, 1121 English-speaking volunteers participated online via the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). We employed a 2 (Presence of Trait instructions: yes, no) x 2 (Content of AA Instructions: approach Niffites, approach Luupites) x 2 (Presence of AA Training: yes, no) between-subjects design (Table 1) .
Data-exclusion involved removing participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks (257 participants; i.e., 22.9%), or (b) made at least one error on the memory questions that probed memory for valence or AA instructions (189 participants; i.e., 21.9 %).
1 After removing participants based on the previous two criteria, there were no additional participants who needed to be removed because of IAT error rates above 30% across the entire task, or above 40% for any one of the four critical blocks (Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013) . Analyses were performed on the data of 675 participants (440 women, mean age = 32, SD = 13).
Procedure. All participants were first familiarized with the two fictitious social groups (i.e., Luupites and Niffites). They read that all the names of Luupites have two consecutive vowels in them and end with "lup". Then they were shown two examples of Luupites' names (i.e., Loomalup, Ageelup). Subsequently, participants read that all the names of Niffites would contain two consecutive consonants and end with "nif." This statement was followed by two Niffites names (i.e., Borrinif, Kennunif).
Half of the participants were then given trait instructions. Similar to Gregg et al. (2006) , participants were asked to imagine that these two social groups actually exist and to suppose that the two groups have very different characters. They were instructed that one group 'are very good people; they are peaceful, civilized, benevolent, and law-abiding, whereas the other group 'are very bad people; they are violent, savage, malicious, and lawless.' Participants were also instructed to suppose that the two groups consistently behave in ways that justified these descriptions when they interact with each other and with other groups. Participants were asked to try and keep clear in their minds which group is which and which group possesses which characteristics as they would later be asked questions about the groups. Half of the participants who received trait instructions learned that Niffites are good and Luupites are bad, whereas the other half received instructions that conveyed the idea that Luupites are good and Niffites are bad.
Subsequently, all participants received AA instructions. Half of the participants were told that they would have to approach each name of a Luupite and avoid each name of a Niffite. The other participants were given the opposite instruction. These AA instructions were followed by the information that we would later on explain exactly how they would be able to perform these actions, but that for now it was very important to remember which action they would have to perform with each type of name as they would need this information to complete the task successfully.
Following the AA instructions, only half of the participants actually performed the AA training task. This manipulation was orthogonal to (1) Luupites' names (i.e., Meesolup, Naanolup, Omeelup, Wenaalup) were each presented ten times.
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Participants pushed away names by pressing the up arrow on the keyboard (i.e., avoided) and pulled names towards them by pressing the down arrow on the keyboard (i.e., approached). A zoom effect enhanced the visual experience of approaching or avoiding; names that were avoided became smaller and moved off into the perceptual distance, whereas names that were approached became larger and appeared to move toward the participant. Only actions that were in line with the AA instructions were registered as correct and resulted in the zoom effect. Incorrect responses were not registered. Participants always had to perform the correct response to proceed to the following trial. The other half of the participants did not receive AA training and they were instructed that they would complete a reaction time task which would last approximately 10 minutes before they could start the AA task.
The reaction time task that followed was an IAT in which participants categorized positive words, negative words, and the names of members of both social groups into one of four categories: positive, negative, Niffites, or Luupites. The IAT followed the procedure described in more detail in Van Dessel et al. (2015) . To investigate the extent to which changes in implicit evaluation are mediated by changes in explicit evaluations we performed mediation analyses with the LAVAAN package (version 0.5-16; Rosseel, 2012) . We used the bootstrap method to estimate standard errors for the effects.
Results indicated that changes in implicit evaluations were mediated by corresponding changes in explicit evaluations, both when participants received only AA instructions (Z = 2.31, p = .021), and when they received AA instructions and subsequent AA training (Z = 2.03, p = .042).
Importantly, however, the AA effect on implicit evaluations remained significant after controlling suggesting that, once established, implicit evaluations cannot be easily changed (Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007) . Recently, however, research has shown that new valenced information about a stimulus can lead to a rapid revision of implicit evaluations, but only when this information is considered highly diagnostic about the evaluative properties of this stimulus (Mann, Cone & Ferguson, 2015; 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we further explored AA instruction effects in the context of trait instructions. The aim of this experiment was two-fold. First, we aimed to replicate the finding that AA instructions cause a direct influence on implicit evaluation in the absence of changes in explicit evaluation. In contrast to Experiment 1, we counterbalanced the order of the IAT and the explicit rating task to exclude the possibility that performing the implicit evaluation task first, changed the effects on explicit evaluations (see Perugini, Richetin & Zogmaister, 2014 
Procedure. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following points.
First, participants were randomly assigned to start with the IAT and then perform the explicit rating task or to perform tasks in the opposite order. Second, participants never received actual AA training. Third, all of the participants received trait instructions. Fourth, not all of the participants received AA instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either (1) no AA instructions, (2) instructions to approach Niffites and avoid Luupites, or (3) instructions to approach Luupites and avoid Niffites. Hence, this experiment employed a 2 (Content of Trait Instructions: Niffites are good, Luupites are good) x 3 (AA Instructions: approach Niffites, approach Luupites, no AA instructions) between-subjects design (Table 3) .
Split-half reliability of the IAT score was r(472) = .92. Internal consistency of the explicit evaluation score was high (Cronbach's Alpha = .96), and this score correlated significantly with the IAT score, r(470) = .59, p < .001. 
Results
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In line with Experiment 1, mediation analyses on the data of participants who received both AA and trait instructions showed that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations were not significantly mediated by corresponding changes in explicit evaluations, Z = 1.87, p = .062. The effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations remained significant after controlling for explicit evaluations, Z = 2.92, p = .003.
Discussion
Results from Experiment 2 provide further support for the idea that the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluations is not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations.
Replicating the pattern obtained in Experiment 1, participants who received AA instructions exhibited an implicit, but not an explicit preference for the approached group over the avoided group when prior instructions specified the valence of these groups. Mediation analyses indicated
that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluation were not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluation in the context of trait instructions.
Additionally, results indicated that AA instructions caused changes in implicit evaluation even when the valence implied by the approach or avoidance action was incompatible with the evaluative information provided in the trait instructions. This suggests that AA instructions can (partly) undo recently established implicit evaluations, even in the absence of changes in explicit evaluations. This contrasts evidence that implicit evaluations are more difficult to change than explicit evaluations with verbally presented counter-attitudinal information (Gregg et al., 2006) .
We found no evidence that AA instructions caused changes in implicit evaluations when these instructions were compatible with the trait instructions. This is consistent with previous findings that AA training causes changes in implicit evaluations of social groups only when the training is incompatible with participants' evaluations (Kawakami et al., 2007) . It suggests that AA effects may be strongly reduced when participants have clearly univalent positive or negative implicit evaluations and corroborates previous evidence that the effectiveness of instructions to approach or avoid a stimulus may critically depend on specific stimulus properties (e.g., whether a stimulus is novel or well-known; see Van Dessel et al., 2015) .
General Discussion
In two experiments, we observed that instructions to approach or avoid members of a fictitious group impact implicit evaluations of these groups. Our results indicate that these changes in implicit evaluation are not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations.
Experiment 1 provided evidence that participants who merely received AA instructions and participants who received additional AA training exhibited a direct effect on implicit evaluations.
Moreover, both procedures caused changes in implicit evaluations even when trait instructions clearly specified the valence of the groups which canceled any AA effect on explicit evaluative ratings. Experiment 2 corroborated that AA instructions influenced implicit, but not explicit evaluations in the context of trait instructions and extended these findings by showing that AA instructions caused changes in implicit evaluations when AA instructions were incompatible with the trait instructions.
These findings have meaningful theoretical and practical implications. We first discuss implications for theories on the mental processes that underlie implicit evaluation. Afterwards, we discuss implications for mental process theories that account for AA instruction and AA training effects. Finally, we discuss practical implications of the present research.
Implications for theories of implicit evaluation
The current experiments provide important information that constrains current and future models of implicit evaluation. First, the observation that AA instructions have a direct influence on implicit evaluation (i.e., independent of changes in explicit evaluation) is difficult to reconcile with associative and dual-process models of evaluation that only allow for evaluative associations to form (1) gradually as the result of many pairings (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Rydell & McConnell, 2006) or (2) rapidly when consciously entertaining the proposition that a stimulus is positive or negative (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) . However, dual-process models can accommodate these findings if they allow for the immediate formation of associations even on the basis of information that is not considered to be valid. Also propositional single-process accounts of evaluation can account for our results if they assume that the automatic activation of propositional information underlies implicit evaluation (De Houwer, 2014) . More specifically, receiving AA instructions may allow participants to consider the proposition that the approached social group is positive. A dissociation between implicit and explicit evaluation will arise when this proposition is judged to be invalid (and thus dismissed when making an explicit evaluation) but still automatically retrieved when the social group is implicitly evaluated.
Second, the observation that incompatible AA instructions reduce effects of trait instructions on implicit, but not on explicit evaluations suggests that implicit evaluations can be updated rapidly. It provides direct evidence against the often entertained idea that implicit evaluations are more difficult to change than explicit evaluations via counter-attitudinal information (Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006) . Rather, changes in explicit evaluation seem to critically depend on the perceived validity of the obtained evaluative information (Peters & Gawronski, 2011) . When information directly contradicts previous valence information, this causes an immediate reversal of participants' explicit liking of the stimulus (Gregg et al., 2006) . Because AA instructions do not invalidate the more diagnostic evaluative trait information, they do not influence explicit evaluation when they contradict trait instructions.
In contrast, changes in implicit evaluations may arise as the result of any information that links a stimulus with a specific valence, such as information about its relation with another valenced stimulus (see Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014) or with a valenced action (Van Dessel et al., 2015) . Immediate changes in implicit evaluation may occur, even when participants do not consider the obtained information as valid.
Note that the present findings do not contradict the idea that the impact of counterattitudinal information strongly depends on the diagnosticity of this information . In fact, our data also suggest that AA instructions have a stronger influence on implicit evaluation if they are more diagnostic. This can be inferred from the fact that we observed a bigger AA instruction effect in the absence of trait instructions, that is, when the AA instructions were the most diagnostic piece of information that was available to the participants.
However, our results extend the previous research by showing that changes in implicit evaluations may occur as the result of instructions even when these instructions provide information that is not considered highly diagnostic of the evaluative properties of the stimulus and therefore do not influence explicit evaluations. This effect is automatic in the sense that, in all likelihood, our participants did not intend to use this information for their evaluation.
In sum, the current findings provide important information for theories that explain how implicit evaluations arise and can be changed. Although our results cannot distinguish between the broad class of single-process propositional and the broad class of dual-process models, they do force these models into adopting specific assumptions without which they cannot account for our effects. In general, we believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between broad classes of models like dual-process or single-process models that have such a high degree of flexibility. Therefore, we believe that, in order to further advance research on evaluation, it is necessary to (1) define specific models (e.g., propositional or association-formation models of AA effects) that make testable predictions and (2) perform research to test these predictions. The data produced by such research will allow us to further constrain these models and to have greater confidence in the assumptions that survive this process.
Implications for accounts of AA instruction and AA training effects
First, the current findings indicate that instructions that link a valenced action and a fictitious social group cause unintentional changes in the implicit evaluation of these groups. This extends knowledge about the effects of AA instructions by showing that these effects are not necessarily the result of controlled, non-automatic processes that involve the intentional use of this information for evaluation (e.g., as the result of demand compliance) (Van Dessel et al., 2015) .
Second, our results also constrain ideas about the processes that underlie AA training effects. More specifically, they reveal important similarities between the effects of AA training and those of AA instructions. Not only can both interventions lead to changes in implicit evaluations, they both can have direct effects on implicit evaluations, that is, effects that are not mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. Although these similarities do not prove that both types of effects are due to the same mental processes (e.g., the formation and activation of propositions), they are in line with this idea and hence undermine the position that AA training effects can be due only to low level processes such as the gradual, performance-driven formation of associations in memory (e.g., Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011) . Future studies are required to establish whether instructions and pairings are also similar regarding other features, for example regarding uncontrollability (see Gawronski, Balas, & Creighton, 2014) . 
Practical Implications
APPROACH-AVOIDANCE INSTRUCTION
29
AA training is considered an important procedure for the modification of pathological biases in cognitive functioning (see Woud & Becker, 2014) . Repeatedly performing AA movements in response to specific stimuli has proven effective in a number of therapeutic contexts such as the treatment of alcohol addiction (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011) , social anxiety (Taylor & Amir, 2012) , or contamination-related fear (Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013) . Given the important relation between implicit evaluation and the dysfunctional behavioral responses under investigation (see Houben, Havermans, & Wiers, 2010) , it can be argued that changes in implicit evaluation may (partly) underlie therapeutic effects of AA training. Following this reasoning, our current results may indicate that AA instructions could play an important role in these AA training effects. Preliminary evidence supporting this idea was found in a recent study by Wiers et al. (2014) where therapeutic effects of 'avoid alcohol' training at one month follow-up were more robust if participants had received explicit instructions to push alcohol away in addition to the re-training procedure. Future research might consider whether replacing or complementing AA training with AA instructions may improve the therapeutic effectiveness of AA training.
Concluding remarks
In sum, the present results extend past findings that verbal instructions influence implicit evaluation by showing that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations occur in the absence of mediation by changes in explicit evaluation. These findings provide insight into the mechanisms underlying implicit evaluation and open up important new avenues for changing implicit evaluations. 
